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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
JUDGMENTS RENDERED ABROAD - STATE LAW
OR FEDERAL LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States the question of what law governs the recognition
and enforcement of judgments rendered by courts of foreign countries has
never been conclusively settled. Although the Supreme Court specifically
dealt with the problem in 1895 in Hilton v. Guyot,'- that case arose from
a lower federal court and did not purport to bind the states. As a result,
state court decisions have not been uniform and several states have assumed
constitutional freedom to reject the Supreme Court rule. The advent of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins2 further confused the issue since under the Erie
doctrine the lower federal courts may be bound to follow the judgments law
of the forum state. However, the recognition of the pre-eminence of the
federal government in international law and foreign relations, coupled with
an expanding concept of federal common law, would appear to indicate
that in the absence of a federal statute or treaty, the Supreme Court will
be the final arbiter of a uniform national policy in this area.
II. THE Hilton DOCTRINE
The absence of federal treaties or statutory provisions concerning the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has allowed the law
in this field to develop by judicial decision. The most detailed exposition of
the principles governing this area of the law is contained in the Supreme
Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot.3 Since this decision is the only state-
ment of the Supreme Court on the subject and may be interpreted to be
the law of the land a detailed statement of the case is warranted.
The action was brought in a federal court upon a judgment recovered
in France against an American defendant. The French court had jurisdic-
tion and the defendant had appeared after being served. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment that had been given below in favor of the judgment
creditor. Justice Gray, speaking for a five to four majority, first declared
the problem to be one of private international law governed by the doctrine
of comity, which he declared to be, "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws."'4 After concluding that judgments in rem
or quasi in rem rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon regular
proceedings and notice would be given conclusive effect, regardless of how
1. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 159 U.S. 113 (1895) ; see Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 783, 790 (1950).
4. Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 3, at 164.
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the rendering court would treat a similar American judgment,5 the Court
focused on the issue of the effect to be given to in personam money judg-
ments. After an exhaustive review of the authorities and judicial trends in
both America and England, the Court recognized the general rule to be:
Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own
country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,
the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this country
upon the judgment, be tried afresh .... 6
The Court noted that there was an issue of fraud in the case, but
found it unnecessary to consider it since there was a separate ground upon
which the comity of nations could be held not to require the Court to give
conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France - the want of
reciprocity. 7 The Court found that there was hardly a civilized nation on
either continent that allowed conclusive effect to executory foreign judg-
ments for the recovery of money; and since international law is founded
upon "mutuality" and "reciprocity," the judgment was not entitled to be
considered conclusive.8 Thus the Court held that a judgment is not con-
clusive on the merits unless the rendering country would accord the same
effect to a judgment rendered in the United States. Otherwise, the foreign
judgment will merely constitute "prima facie evidence . . .of the justice of
the plaintiff's claim."9 However, it must be noted that the doctrine of
reciprocity adopted by the Court in Hilton applies only in the situation
where an action is brought upon an in personam judgment rendered against
an American defendant in a foreign court. 10
Although the doctrine espoused in Hilton has never been overruled
and should therefore be respected as the rule of the Supreme Court, its
5. Id. at 166-67.
6. Id. at 202-03.
7. Id. at 210.
8. But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), where
the Court withdrew from the proposition that international law is based on reciprocity.
9. 159 U.S. at 227.
10. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964) ; Reese,
supra note 3, at 792. The doctrine of reciprocity has been severely criticized by com-
mentators, often on the basis of Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, in which he said: "The
application of the doctrine of res judicata does not rest in discretion; and it is for
the government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed
under any circumstances desirable or necessary." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234
(1895) (dissenting opinion). See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS 1381-89 (1935);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAWS 392 (Scoles ed. 1964) ; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT oF LAWS 129 (3d ed. 1963) ; Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign
Judgments: A Historical - Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REv. 465, 471-74 (1956);
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validity may be questioned on several grounds. The case came from a
lower federal court; it did not involve a federal question concerning which
a decision by the Supreme Court is binding upon the states; and the decision
itself did not expressly purport to bind the states. Since the case was
decided under the reign of Swift v. Tyson" it may be posited that the
decision was an expression of the federal common law of the period, appli-
cable only to the lower federal courts. Furthermore, under Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. 12 where the Court declared that in diversity cases
the federal courts must apply the conflict of laws rules of the forum state
under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, it can be argued that the
lower federal courts must follow state law on the subject of judgments.
III. STATUS OF THE LAW
Since state statutes concerning the enforcement of judgments are
virtually non-existent, 13 the determination of the issue has been left to the
common law rules of conflict of laws. The state courts that have considered
the question of the respect to be given to judgments rendered abroad have
either adopted the reciprocity doctrine of Hilton,14 embraced a principle
of unlimited judicial review, 5 or granted the foreign judgments conclusive
effect. 16 This last view represents the modern tendency,1 7 and the judg-
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). "We are of the opinion that the prohibition declared
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ... against such independent determinations by the
federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws."
13. California is the only state known to have a statute on the enforcement of
foreign judgments. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CoDg § 1915.
14. See, e.g., Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1948); Northern
Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 Atl. 715 (1929); Traders Trust Co. v.
Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735 (1920) ; In re Vanderborght, 57 Ohio L. Abs.
143, 91 N.E.2d 47 (C.P. 1950) ; Banco Minero v. Ross & Masterson 196 Tex. 552,
138 S.W. 224 (1911); Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513
(1925) (dictum).
In In re Alexandravicus, 83 N.J. Super. 303, 199 A.2d 662 (1964), the court
cited Hilton and noted that it had been cited approvingly in Sabbatino. However,
it is unclear whether this citation is sufficient to indicate that reciprocity is the rule
of that state.
Pennsylvania has cited Hilton for the proposition that recognition is not a
matter of absolute obligation under the principles of comity, but it remains unclear
if this would demand reciprocity. See Commonwealth ex rel. Thompson v. Yarnell,
313 Pa. 244, 169 Atd. 370 (1933).
15. Tremblay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (1903).
16. Johnston v. Compagnie G~nrale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387-88, 152
N.E. 121, 123 (1926) ; Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120,
219 N.Y. Supp. 284 (1927), affd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927). See Martens
v. Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 366, 31 N.E.2d 489, 490 (1940). Other cases adopting the
conclusive doctrine are Adamsen v. Adamsen, 151 Conn. 172, 195 A.2d 418 (1963);
Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
964 (1961) (Delaware refused to apply collateral estoppel but held that otherwise
foreign judgments were conclusive) ; The Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 726, 189
So. 116 (1939); 164 East Seventy-Second St. Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574,
151 P.2d 29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (adopting their statute on judgments) ; cf. RFSTA'r-
MgNT (SXcOND), CONFLIT OF LAws § 430(e) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965): "A valid
judgment rendered in a foreign country after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the under-
lying cause of action are concerned."
17. See GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 391.
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ments of foreign courts having jurisdiction are conclusive, subject only
to certain exceptions."8 Of the states that have assumed constitutional
freedom to reject Hilton, the position taken by the New York courts is
the most noteworthy. 19 Judge Pound, speaking for the New York Court
of Appeals in Johnston v. Cornpagnie Gin~rale Transatlantique,20 held
that the question was one of private international law and private rights
which the New York courts could determine without reference to rules
laid down by the federal courts. 21 In Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp &
Paper Co.22 the plaintiff sued to recover on a judgment rendered in Quebec,
where American judgments are not given conclusive effect, and the defen-
dant argued that the judgment was merely prima facie evidence of liability.
The court stated that: "The force and effect which is to be given to a
foreign judgment is for each sovereign power to determine for itself. Its
policy in this respect is determined by its statutes or by the decisions of
its courts. ' '28
Prior to Erie, federal courts had frequently acknowledged the Hilton
doctrine,2 4 but since that decision in 1938, none have squarely faced the
now classical question of whether a federal court sitting in a state which
had rejected Hilton would have to follow the state rule under Erie, or
whether as a matter of federal law, both the federal and state courts would
be bound by the Hilton doctrine.25
IV. Erie AND THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
As stated in Erie: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. It was announced two years before Hilton, in Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y.
70, 71, 33 N.E. 729, 730 (1893), that a foreign judgment is conclusive on the merits
and can be impeached only by want of jurisdiction or for fraud.
20. 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
21. Id. at 386, 152 N.E. at 123.
22. 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y. Supp. 284, aff'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669
(1927).
23. 219 App. Div. at 120-21, 219 N.Y. Supp. at 286.
24, E.g., In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) ;
Venezuelan Meat Export Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 379 (D. Md. 1935);
Strauss v. Conried, 121 Fed. 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1902). Courts have often evaded
the Erie issue. See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 230 F. Supp. 998
(N.D. Ill. 1964), following Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952). Or,
after raising the issue, the courts have failed to decide it. See Compania Mexicana
Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Tex. 1941), aff'd, 131
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942) ; cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 430(e),
comment e at 3 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965), where it is noted that no federal or state
court has ever suggested that the Hilton rule of reciprocity is binding.
25. When a transaction is one of private international law, or international con-
flicts of laws as it may be called, one of three bodies of law may be controlling: state
law, federal law or international law. Although the methods and conditions of enforce-
ment of foreign judgments vary greatly, there is no real basis of international com-
plaint, or requirements for recognition in international conflict cases. Therefore the
question must be governed by either state law or federal law. See EHRVNZW4IG,
UONFLICT OF LAWS 169 (1962); Cheatham, Sources of Rules For Conflict of Laws,
89 U. PA. L. RPv. 430, 431, 436 (1941).
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matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law."'26
While Justice Brandeis thus purported to lay to rest the "federal general
common law,' 2 7 on the same day he delivered another opinion which
concerned a controversy between two states over the waters of a river in
which he stated that: "Whether the water of an interstate stream must be
apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law'
upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can
be conclusive.
'28
Thus at the same time that the Court declared the supremacy of state
law with regard to all matters not governed by the Constitution or federal
statute or treaty, it also stimulated the development of a body of federal
common law that is binding upon the state and federal courts alike.2 9 The
next year federal law was applied to override a state law in a suit to
recover taxes and interest thereon erroneously collected from an Indian
ward. 0 In 1942 the Court held that "federal decisional" law was controlling
in a suit by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on a note trans-
ferred by a state bank as collateral.8 ' Justice Jackson, in a concurring
opinion, stated that federal common law implements the federal constitution
and statutes, and that in such cases the federal courts are free to draw upon
all the sources of the common law.8 2 However, the doctrine of the new
federal common law was first fully enunciated in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States,8 where the question presented was whether state or federal
law governed recovery on a guarantee of endorsements on a government
check. The Court found that the Erie doctrine did not apply and since
transactions in commercial paper issued by the United States will com-
monly occur in several states, "the application of state law, even without
the conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of
the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.
'8 4
In United States v. Standard Oil Co.,35 the Clearfield doctrine was
applied to a tort claim by the United States. Erie was held to have no
26. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
27. Hinderlider v. LaPlatz River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
28. Id. at 110.
29. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 405, 407 (1964). Thus, where Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), had only been binding in the federal forum, the new body of law,
under the supremacy clause, was binding in every forum in areas of national concern
thereby creating true uniformity. Friendly, supra at 405.
30. Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
31. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
32. Id. at 472. This concurring opinion is well known for its misleading implica-
tions that Erie is limited to diversity cases. Id. at 466-68, 471-72.
3. 318 U.S. 363 (1943), 43 COLUM. L. Rev. 520 (1943). For criticism of the
Court's reasoning in Clearfield, see Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. Rev. 797, 828-32 (1951).
34. 318 U.S. at 367.
35. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUm. L. Rsv. 489, 533-34 (1954).
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effect on matters that were "exclusively federal" whether they were made
so by constitutional or congressional command or on other matters, "so
vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the Federal Government
as to require uniform national disposition rather than diversified state
rulings.' '36 The Court went on to state that the federal judiciary had power
to deal with "essentially federal" matters, "even though Congress has not
acted affirmatively about the specific question."37 The Court went on to
limit the Erie doctrine, stating that it would not be applied when it would
result in, "substantially diversified treatment where uniformity is indicated
as more appropriate, in view of the nature of the subject matter and the
specific issues affecting the Government's interest." 88 The scope of this
federal interest has been expanded to include patent and copyright law, 9
federal labor statutes, and federal statutes in general.
40
The above illustrates that where uniformity of law is required, whether
in interstate matters, federal fiscal problems, or implementation of federal
statutes, Erie may be pre-empted. However, while the development of
exceptions to Erie has expanded the scope of the new federal common law,
a separate line of cases has developed in another area, similarly within the
federal domain - the field of foreign relations. 41 The Court has broadly
stated that, where foreign relations are concerned, local laws and policies
become irrelevant and the "complete power over international affairs is in
the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtail-
ment or interference on the part of the several states."4 This declaration
of exclusive federal power has its roots in the famous dictum by Justice
Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,43 where he
deemed the federal power over foreign relations inherent in the sovereignty
of the United States as a nation in contradistinction to a power delegated
by the Constitution. Under this theory, federal law would be applied, not
as an exception to Erie, but because it is an area over which state policies
and law can have no jurisdiction. However, these foreign relations cases
were based on actions by the Executive. Although there is little ambiguity
in the broad powers claimed in Justice Sutherland's dictum, it can be
rationally argued that the power of the judiciary in extranational matters
is limited to subjects concerning which there has been some action by the
36. 332 U.S. at 307.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 309.
39. See Solo Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 175-76 (1942). See
also DeSylvia v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956).
40. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (§ 10(b) of the
Security Exchange Act and rule X-10b-5 of the SEC) ; Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (NLRA). See generally Bickel & Welling-
ton, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.
L. RItv. 1 (1957) ; Friendly, supra note 29, at 412-13.
41. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
42. United States v. Belmont, supra note 41, at 331.
43. 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
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political branches of the federal government. An answer to this argument
might be found in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,44 where the most
recent expansion of the federal common law was joined with the latest
enunciation of the federal judiciary's role in foreign affairs. In reaching
the conclusion that the act of state doctrine, a non-statutory rule, was
"intrinsically federal" and therefore binding upon state and federal courts
as a matter of federal common law, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for an
eight to one majority, first addressed himself to the legal basis of the
doctrine. He found that the doctrine was not compelled by "the inherent
nature of sovereign authority," nor by some rule of international law.4 5
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, made clear that the conduct of foreign rela-
tions is not committed solely to the executive and legislative departments
as an aspect of the separation of powers, and that the judiciary is therefore
not precluded from acting in this area without prior authorization from
the political branches. Having laid this groundwork, the Court then found
that the act of state doctrine, although not required by the Constitution,
does have "constitutional" underpinnings. "It arises out of the basic rela-
tionships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers," and, "concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make
and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations." 46 These constitutional underpinnings are in "the strong sense
of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the
validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole
in the international sphere. '47 The Court appears to state that in the area
of foreign relations, which is uniquely federal and in need of a uniform rule,
it is the Court that is exercising the federal authority.
48
As to the question of whether state law or federal law was applicable, the
Court said that even though New York law was similar to federal decisions:
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively
as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did
not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.4 9
Having declared the power of the Court to create law in the absence of
authority from the political branches, Justice Harlan turned to the body
of federal common law for support. Recognizing that many of the "uniquely
federal" interests protected by this judicial law were based upon federal
44. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
45. Id. at 421.
46. Id. at 423.
47. Ibid.
48. 376 U.S. at 425; see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal
Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. Rgv. 805, 819 (1964).
49. 376 U.S. at 425.
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statutes he said, "perhaps more directly in point are the bodies of law
applied between States over boundaries and in regard to the apportionment
of interstate waters." 50 Emphasizing the private nature of these questions,
he found the apportionment problems and problems surrounding the act
of state doctrine both to be "intrinsically federal."511 Although it may be
questioned just how "directly in point" these cases are to an establishment
of "intrinsically federal" power in the foreign relations area,5 2 it appears
quite clear that the Court has so decided. Whether the constitutional basis
for this power lies in the nature of the subject or arises from the inter-
relationships of competency within the separation of powers, the net effect,
for our present purposes, is the same. The question then becomes whether
foreign judgments rise to the level of foreign relations or whether the
question is so uniquely federal as to require exclusive federal control.
V. LEGAL STATUS
The question is not what law should govern on the basis of the merits
of the competing interests, but what law appears to be controlling from
an examination of the developments to date. Sabbatino settled some of the
questions as to the scope of the federal common law. It is now clear that
the doctrine as enunciated in Clearfteld is not limited to situations where
the federal government is a party and where there is a grant of federal
jurisdiction over the action (as where a federal statute is involved). Judge
Pound's argument for holding Hilton inapplicable to a state action was
based on a distinction between private and public rights in the field of
international conflicts.5 8 The Sabbatino Court, in relying heavily on the
water apportionment cases, noted that a federal interest cannot be under-
mined by the states on the basis that they are dealing with private parties.54
Furthermore, the action before the Court in Sabbatino was likewise between
private individuals involving the local question of ownership of property.55
This would seem to indicate that it is not the public or private nature of
the individual case that is controlling, but rather the federal nature of the
function involved or the need for uniformity in an area of national concern.
The case was based on "pure diversity" jurisdiction since no federal statute
was involved, and the Court noted that it was unnecessary to reach the
federal question issue.
50
It has been suggested that there was a basis in Justice Sutherland's
dictum in Curtiss-Wright for the theory that decisions of the Supreme
50. Id. at 426.
51. Id. at 427.
52. Henkin, supra note 48, at 817. Henkin notes that the power of the Court to
create law is clear where interstate boundaries and waters are involved since the law
of neither of the states before the Court should govern the controversy.
53. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
54. 376 U.S. at 426-27.
55. The suit in Sabbatino was between a commodity broker and a financial agent
of the government of Cuba over the title to a quantity of sugar. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
56. 376 U.S. at 421 n.20.
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Court should govern the question of conclusiveness of judgments through-
out the country.57 However, since this dictum has not been followed, the
states will remain free to adopt their own conditions for recognition until
the Supreme Court assumes wider authority in this field.58 The assump-
tion of authority by the Court in Sabbatino would seem to lend support
to an argument that the Court is ready to exercise more authority in this
area. There is little question that the area of foreign judgments could be
treated as the subject of a treaty.5 9 Recognition of this fact alone admits to
the proposition that the subject is within the scope of federal power. How-
ever, the traditional argument against this line of reasoning has been that
state authority in this area may be pre-empted only by an act of the political
branches of the federal government.6" Perhaps the most important aspect
of Sabbatino with respect to this issue is the Court's apparent assumption
of the authority to make federal common law where the federal govern-
ment has power to act but where the political branches have not yet done so.
Any uncertainty as to the constitutional underpinnings of Sabbatino lies
not in the Court's assumption of judicial power in this area but only as
to its scope. The fact that the Court has already exercised authority in
the area of foreign relations would seem to indicate that the Court's power
extends to at least this area. It may therefore be argued that the issue of
the enforcement of foreign judgments will be deemed a proper subject for
federal common law as a result of its effect on our foreign relations. 61
It should also be kept in mind that in Hilton the Court has already
spoken in the judgments area so that all that would be required would be a
reaffirmation of that decision in light of the new federal common law. An
examination of the status of that decision may help to determine if such
a reaffirmation is likely. Since Hilton was decided under the reign of
Swift v. Tyson and may be considered as binding only the federal courts
as part of the conflicts rules of those courts, it can be argued that the
principles espoused therein, including the reciprocity doctrine, may have
died with the advent of Erie and Klaxon. However, the same situation
faced the Court with the act of state doctrine in Sabbatino. There the
Court stated that the pre-Erie act of state cases were not mere interpreta-
tions of common law under Swift v. Tyson, and that the language in those
cases suggested that the states were not free to formulate their own doc-
trines.6 2 It may be argued that the Hilton decision, in light of the thorough-
ness of its exposition and its emphasis on international aspects, both public
and private,68 should be considered a matter of binding national policy in
the same manner as the early act of state cases. Furthermore, the Hilton
57. EHRENZWtIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 164 (1962).
58. Ibid.
59. EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra at 166; Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American
Judgments, 65 HARV. L. Rzv. 1184, 1188-91 (1952); cf. Lenhoff, Reciprocity - The
Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 752, 768 (1952).
60. Lenhoff, supra note 59, at 762.
61. See Reese, supra note 3, at 788.
62. 376 U.S. at 426.
63. 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
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doctrine was given new life by Sabbatino; for in answer to the argument
that the reciprocity doctrine applied to the issue of standing in that case,
Justice Harlan reiterated the Hilton position noting that reciprocity applied
only to the conclusiveness of judgments and then only in certain limited
circumstances. 64 As to the argument that Klaxon would control an action
brought in a federal court, it must be noted that in that case the Court
held only that the federal courts may not go their own way in diversity
actions. The Court said nothing about the obligations or authority of the
federal courts in dealing with foreign law. 65 It would seem that when the
law or judgment of a foreign country is involved the question is hardly one
of local policy or concern since it is an international conflicts question im-
pinging on national interests and the foreign relations of the United States.66
If the basis of the Erie decision was the attainment of uniformity
between state and federal courts so as to avoid forum shopping, 67 what
is the effect of finding a question like act of state or foreign judgments a
matter of federal common law? Under Judge Friendly's "so beautifully
simple, and so simply beautiful"' 68 conception of the new federal common
law the much desired uniformity is not lost, for in local matters a state
will have its way and its decisions are binding in federal courts through
Erie; and in matters of national concern federal policy is supreme and state
courts must follow. There will be diversity in local issues among the states
as may be expected in federalism, and where national issues are involved
there will be uniformity as is implied in federal supremacy. But on all
issues the substantive law will be the same in the federal courts and state
courts within a given state.69 If such is the status of the law, the question
then becomes what is the price to be paid for this uniformity?
VI. WHAT LAW SHouLD BE CONTROLLING
National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in
our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special
rather than the ordinary case. This point of view cuts even deeper
than the concept of the central government as one of granted, limited
authority, articulated in the Tenth Amendment. National power may
be quite unquestioned in a given situation; those who would advocate
its exercise must nonetheless answer the preliminary question why
the matter should not be left to the states. Even when Congress acts,
its tendency has been to frame enactments on an ad hoc basis to
accomplish limited objectives, supplanting state-created norms only
64. 376 U.S. 398, 411-12 (1964). See In Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v.
United States Steel Corp., 300 Fed. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (cited by the Sabbatino
Court).
6. See Henkin, supra note 48, at 820 n.51: "As to such choice of law, the
Supreme Court held, in effect, that the federal courts may not go their own way and
make law for themselves in diversity cases; the Court held and said nothing about
the obligations or authority of the federal courts in dealing with foreign law."
66. Ibid.
67. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
68. Friendly, supra note 29, at 422. However, Judge Friendly would limit the
application of the new federal common law to "subjects within national legislative
power where Congress has so directed." Ibid.
69. See Henkin, supra note 48, at 814.
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so far as may be necessary for the purpose. Indeed, with all the cen-
tralizing growth throughout the years, federal law is still a largely
interstitial product, rarely occupying any field completely, building
normally upon legal relationships established by the states.
70
It may be assumed for purposes of the present discussion that the
question of foreign judgments falls within the scope of federal power and
that there are solid legal grounds for an application of a uniform federal
rule such as that espoused in Hilton v. Guyot. We are concerned in this
instance with the competing policies and the practicalities involved in decid-
ing whether such a rule should be applied.
Of primary consideration is whether this is the type of issue that the
Supreme Court can consider without being unduly burdened with litigation
as a result. It has been suggested that the whole field of private inter-
national law is within the scope of federal common law, but that the ex-
pansion in this area will be limited to matters of high federal concern due
to the reluctance of the Court to interfere with the developing character of
conflict of laws.71 Although the Court thoroughly considered the question
of foreign money judgments in Hilton, there are unsettled areas as to the
requirements for recognition which would demand action by the Supreme
Court as the questions arose.7 2 But it would seem that the existence of
uncertainties in an area where international transactions are involved is
precisely the kind of situation that requires a uniform rule. Since there is
a dearth of decisions in most of these areas, it is not likely that there would
be a flood of litigation as a result of reaffirming a view already followed by
many jurisdictions; and any decisions that the Court would have to make
would serve a practical purpose.
But of further consideration are the interests involved. To make a
realistic appraisal of what the states would lose as a result of a change to
a contrary federal policy, certain facts must be kept in mind. The state-
ment of the law in Hilton is the general rule, except for the doctrine of
reciprocity which applies only in limited circumstances. Therefore, a con-
flict arises only when a state court following the New York view wishes
to recognize as conclusive upon the merits a judgment in a situation where
the reciprocity requirement is not met. It is in these situations that a
state's policy interests come into play. As might be expected, the strongest
interests in enforcement will be found in the states most involved in inter-
national transactions, 73 for example, New York and California,7 4 where a
70. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUm. L. RIv. 543,
544-45 (1954).
71. Cheatham, Does Federal or State Law Apply in International Transactionsf,
23 N.Y. COUNTY B. BULL. 200, 202 (1966).
72. Since foreign judgments are not protected by the full faith and credit clause,
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912), and foreign courts are not
bound by our due process requirements, it is unsettled as to what circumstances may
substantiate a denial of enforcement. See Reese, supra note 3, at 796-97, 800.
73. Lenhoff, supra note 59, at 763.
74. The California statute was passed "with the evident object of assuring the
execution of judgments rendered in California, against foreign, especially German,
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policy of reciprocity might do damage to American creditors whose foreign
claims would have to be retried here or abroad. It should be noted that
when a state court ignores reciprocity to give effect to a judgment, it is
actually extending greater rights to the judgment holder then he would
be entitled to under the Hilton doctrine. This is converse to the situation
in Sabbatino where the Court limited judicial inquiry into the validity of
an act of state. To refuse the state the right to restrict its examination of
judgments, an argument must be made for the policy of retorsion, a position
seldom defended, since the main purpose of the policy was apparently the
protection of Americans who had been sued in foreign courts.7 5 The issue,
of course, is what national interests are to be pitted against the local
economic policies of the individual states? American interests abroad are in
constant growth. In international conflicts it appears that a foreign country
would prefer American common law to a choice between the laws of the
several states.76 It has been suggested that the insistence upon formulas
general enough to cover problems of both international and interstate con-
flicts may have hindered the development of rules that would have appro-
priately dealt with situations peculiar to the field of international trans-
actions.7 7 If this is the case, it may be in the national interest to create
uniform law in at least selective areas of international conflicts. The merits
of reciprocity aside, when the doctrine was adopted a majority of countries
adhered to it and many continue to do so.7 8 Basic misunderstandings of
the various judicial systems have hindered the development of a workable
relationship.7 9 Although the conclusion of bilateral treaties might be the
ideal solution to this problem, such a result is unlikely in the near future.
In any event, if progress is to be made in this area, national uniformity
would appear to be a necessity.
The argument for individual state policies previously has been con-
sidered in the foreign relations cases. In Belmont v. United States, where
the public policy of New York would have refused effect to a confiscation
decree over tangible property within its situs, the Court stated that it would
not even pause to inquire whether there was any policy of the state to be
infringed when the external powers of the United States are being exer-
cised.80  In Pink v. United States, decided after Erie, the doctrine of
Belmont was reaffirmed and the policy of New York was again rejected
where it would have refused recovery to the United States acting as an
assignee of Russian claims under the Litvinov Assignment. 81
insurance companies in consequence of the earthquake." Lorenzen, The Enforcement
of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YALt L.J. 188, 204 n.129 (1919).
75. Reese, supra note 3, at 792.
76. Cf. EHRENZWZiG, supra note 57, at 25.
77. EHRSNZWXIG, supra note 57, at 20.
78. Lenhoff, supra note 59, at 763.
79. The fact that the United States does not execute a foreign judgment but only
allows a suit to be brought on that judgment has given reason to foreign countries
requiring reciprocity to decline to give effect to American judgments. Lorenzen, The
Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YAI. L.J. 204, 205 (1919).
80. 301 U.S. 324, 327, 331 (1937).
81. 315 U.S. 203, 223-25 (1942).
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The attitude of the Court concerning the role of state policy interests
where international relations are concerned seems to have been reaffirmed
in Sabbatino. An examination of the problem from the local viewpoint of
the state interests in enforcing or denying enforcement of the judgment is
not sufficient. Foreign courts look to American policy, not to state policy.
The various interests involved are broad, involving a mutual international
understanding of complex problems. Individual state law is incapable of
developing such an understanding, and local interests should not be per-
mitted to hinder its development, particularly where adequate safeguards
are provided for individual interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
In view of the expansion of federal common law into the area of inter-
national relations, and the assumption of power by the federal judiciary
to make decisional law in this area without prior authorization from the
political branches, it seems that the enforcement of foreign judgments will
be considered a matter of federal law, binding on federal and state courts
alike. However, the developments which lead to this conclusion suggest
broader implications. The Court may be ready to accept a more active role
in the development of international conflict of laws rules that would appro-
priately deal with situations peculiar to international transactions. Although
the Court may be reluctant to interfere with the developing character of
these rules, the Court's action seems inevitable where individual state
policies nurture diverse solutions to international questions. It is submitted
that federal power over international matters having been firmly established,
the Supreme Court will next deem that the national interest requires a
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